

130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched. A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

G. C. M.,
Chief of Staff.

I gave original to Mr. Silman.

[Hand written:] (You may have had word of this already!)

EXHIBIT No. 38

[1]

S E C R E T

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 17 October 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude, I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.

Kitts was in this morning and I shall have a long talk with him before he goes back.

Off hand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction.

We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can be kept to a minimum with the curve ever favoring our end.

In August for the first time there was a slight net gain in shipping. Our effort, of course, is to have that confirmed in subsequent months for two reasons—accelerated shipbuilding and better protection to convoys with results—decreased sinkings.

I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased air in the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection. If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can

maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that are being made for alternate routes.

You will be glad to know that recruiting is still on the increase and I can assure I have your personnel situation always on my conscience as well as most every other situation affecting everything afloat.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Will add a P. S. in the a. m. Want this to make the clipper.—H. R. S.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
%Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. Very little news from the Kearny, and we are asking her nothing, feeling that she will notify us as soon as she can. Radio silence may be essential. All we do know is that she was torpedoed in the forward fire room and is now making 8 knots. Not a thing on casualties or beyond the bare facts given above. I will release everything to the press as soon as I can, so you should know almost as soon as I do.

Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet situation, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what he gave me.

Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and by advice to him was not to worry.

He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial photographs I wanted him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be detected and might complicate the international situation. I agreed, and he stated that he would endeavor to make them later.

I have nothing else for the moment.

I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual, that you will show Bloch.

H. R. S.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, October 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the C. N. O.

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain face is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prime Minister Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the *extremists* among the military not that it has opposed Japan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.

MEMORANDUM No. 59

[1]

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-1013-M11

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 14, 1941.

DEAR MONTAPILA: This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and 7, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are going strong.

I have not been able to get very much definite information about Mr. Hallet Abend. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Public Relations has given me about him. I am told by an officer who recently returned from the Asiatic Station that he enjoyed a good reputation as a correspondent out there. This same source stated that the Japs had beaten him up in Shanghai and destroyed a manuscript of a book he was about to submit to his publishers.

I had previously seen the clipping from the New York Times, which you sent me, the authorship of which is credited to Mr. Abend. The way the yarn was written, one could easily spot it as a "phony".

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently subscribed by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.

If Mr. Churchill's speech of Monday last, given at the Lord Mayor's house, is the expression of British policy, it would seem there might be considerable truth in the information given to you by Mr. Abend.¹

Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty examination, it appears to be a very complete paper.

I have taken up with Van Kester the subject of the listening gear for the ships you listed in your letter of November 6. Like Hadar, the delay in getting this gear was caused by *getting* or, rather, *not getting* into production. At last, we are "over the hump" and [2] Listening gear is coming on rapidly. Deliveries are under way, and four (4) or five (5) sets will go to Pearl Harbor by each ship from now on. By mid-December you should have received about 22 sets. Of course, you can divert these for installation as you see fit.

With regard to the VSO's going to the Asiatic. There will go out, crated, in a merchant ship. Instructions to do this have been issued to Com. 12. You should receive a copy of the order to do this in due time.

Regarding your comments about the desirability of having light deck merchant ships for use in training aviators for carrier duty—I agree with you 100%. The trouble is that we just can't get the ships to convert into carriers. The converted SS MORMACMAID (now the USS LONG ISLAND) is far from satisfactory. She should have twenty (20) knots and actually hasn't sixteen (16) knots. She just doesn't have speed enough. She can be operated if conditions of wind are such as to give her the required apparent wind across the deck. Unless this condition prevails, she is almost worthless as a carrier.

¹These paragraphs are privileged and "must not be disclosed without the 'EXPRESSION AUTHORITY OF SECNAV'."